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1NTRODUCTION
Accelerator-driveil transmutation technology (ADIT) has been under study [ 1] at Los Alamos for several years for application to nuclear waste treatment, tritium production, and energy generation. Recently,~pplication ot this technology to the disposition of excess weapons plutonium [2] has been considered.
The goals for this application are to achieve efficient plutonium burning without involving fertile material, which would produce additional plutonium; to provide the potential for essentially complete destruction of unwanted plutonium; to minimize processing of fuel and wastes; to have inherent safety robustness; and to offset plutonium disposition costs through generation of electric power, Studies and evaluations performed to date at Los Alamos have led to the current focus on a fluid-fuel, fission system operating in a source-supported subcritical mode.
The molten salt technology [3] developed at the Oak Rid~e National Laboratory is the basis for the fluid-fuel approach. The fission region is configured and a plutonium concentration is selected such that a desired level of subcriticality is achieved at the operating conditions. High energy protons from a nearby accelerator impinge on a neutron spallation target within the fission region (referred to as the blanket) [U produce a continuous, intense neutron source to sustain the fission process at the power level desired. The LAMPF accelerator technology [4] at Los A!amos is the basis for the high current accelerator required. Spallation targets [5] that have been developed and used at Los Alamos and elsewhere for years form the technology base for the intense neutron source. The integration of these major elemen[s into to a feasible system to achieve the desirti goals is the thrust of ongcing activities at Los Alamos.
As part of the system conceptualization process, safety characteristics of such systems have been theorized and investigated.
In this paper, key safety characteristics of molten salt, accelerator-driven systems are discussed and compared to the safety characteristics for conventional reactors from which the nuclear community, the scientific community, arid the public have established their baseline safety perspectives.
Through this comparison, a safety perspective for molten salt, decelerator-driven systems, which is radically different, is presented. This perspective also addresses the potential of this concept to conform to the safety expectations for advanced fission systems as delineated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in its policy statement on the regulation of advanced nuclear power plants.
FUNDAMENTAL NUCLEAR SAFETY OBJECTIVES
Accelerator-driven subcfi!ical systems involve sustained fission processes that produce power levels comparable to ccnwcntional power reactors. Thus, they can be expected to have large fission product inventories, which constitute hazards of a scale similar to thuse for conventional fission reactors. As such, a reactor-like nuclear safety approach should be employed. Fundamental nuclear safety objectives [6] universally applied to the design of fission reactors are 1) control of fission power, 2) adequate cooling, and 3) containment of radioactive materials. Because there are characteristics of fluid fueled systems that make them resemble nuclear processing systems, two additional safety objectives have been ad~led. These additional objectives are 4) prevention of inadve~ent criticality and 5) control of personnel exposure. All of these objectives should be emphasized during the design process. They also would be the focus of satety reviews and licensing processes.
Meeting these objectives is key to controlling the fundamental health and safety hazard associated with such systems, namely radiation exposure to operations personnel and !% public. Control of power levels and provision of cooling, such that over heating does no: occur at any location where power is generated, must be assured under all conditions (power operation, shutdown, cold or hot standby, various power levels, stages in systems life) and circumstances (component failures, system failures, accidents, e!c.). Likewise, inadvertent criticality and large integrated radiation exposures to personnel must be prevented under all conditions and circumstances.
For such a system to be licensed in the United States, it also would need to have characteristics consistent with those delineated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in Its policy statement on regulation of advanced nuclear power plants [7] . This policy enlphasizes the desirability of the following attributes:
" highly reliable and less complex shutdown and decay heat removal systems, using inherent or passive means; q longer time constants and sufficient instrumentation to allow for more diagnosis and management prior to reaching safety system challenges and/or exposure of vital equipment to adverse conditions; q simplified safety systems which, where possible, reduce required operator action, equipment subjected to severe environmental conditions, and components needed for maintaining safe shutdown conditions; such simplified systems should facilitate operator comprehension, reliable system function, and more straightforward engineering analysis; q designs that minimize the potential for severe accidents and their consequences by prwiding sufficient inherent safety, reliability, redundancy, and independence in safety systems; q designs that provide reli~ble equipment in the balance of plant (or safety system independence from balance of plant) to reduce the number of challenges to safety systems; q.
designs that provide easily m~intained equipment tind components; s designs that reduce potential radiation exposure to plant personnel; q designs that incorporate defense-in-depth philosophy by maintaining multiple barriers against release of radiotictive materials, and by reducing the potential for and consequences of severe accidents; and q design features that can be proven by citation of existent technology or that can be satisfactorily established by commitment to a suittible technology development program, These characteristics provide the si.ifety robustness (simplicity, sluggish response, ptissive system reliability, reduced system interdependencies, reduced severe :,ccident concerns, assured defensein-depth barriers, greater clarity in safety analyses and margins, etc. ) that is desired for advanced systems, the inititi versions of which will have little opemtional history.
SAFETY FEATURES AND PERSPECTIVES
In the this section, a qualitative perspective on the manner in which accelerator-driven subcritical systems and conventional reactors meet the five fundamel.!al safety objectives is presented. The appwent safety robustness, or lack thereof, associated with accelerator-driven subcritical systems also is addressed.
Control of Fission Power
Control of the fission mre and therefore power gerieration has been recognized as an extremely important topic for fission reactors since the beginnings of reactor the~ry. The response of a neutronically critical system is highly nonlinear and rapid; the initial response being related to the prompt neutron generation time aiid the longer term response being related to the addition of delayed neutrons from particular d~caying fisu~on products. Indeed, it is these delayed neutrons that make practical reactor conwol feasible.
A key design objective has always been to ensure reactivity control (and therefore control of fission power) t! rough an understanding the reactivity changes that can~cur in a system and to provide an effective response to those changes using engineered control and safety systems and/or inherent reactivity feedbacks. Reactivity controi systems must be capable of preventing power levels that exceed specific limits, which 'are set to ensure fuel stability (no significant melting, r~ovement, or dimensional changes), cooling sufficiency, and first barrier (clad) integrirj.
To obtain a general sense of the relative responses of critical and subcritical systems to postulated reactivity insertion events, simple point kinetics calculations were performed. The postulated reactivity insertion rate was 1 $/s, and its duration was assumed to be 0.5 s and 1 s. No reactivity fwdbacks were assumed in either case to simplify the understanding of the results. The initial multiplication in the sukitical system was assumed to be 0.96, and the inilial power for both systems was assumed to be 500 MW. The results are shown in Fig. 1 . As expected for the critical system, the power Fses rapidly and continues to rise after the reac!ivi:iy imm-tion is terminated.
Wi :hout negative reactivity insertions from inherent negative feedbacks iind/or insettion uf neutron absorbers, the transients are unterminated.
The response of the subcritical system is ma-kedly different in that the power changes very little. The power is proportional to the inverse of the degree of subcliticality Gf the system, The degree of subcriticality initially is 1-0.96 or 0.04. At the end of the 1 s reactivity insertion transient, me dollar ( for the plutonium fueled molten salt system considered, soliie of the delayed neutron are released beyond the boundaries of the core, making a dollar of reactivity approximately equal to 0.002) of reactivity is inserted, making the final multiplication cf the system equal to 0.962 and the degree of subcritictility equal to 0,038, The power change is approximately 57o, and a new steady state is established.
A subcritical system appears to be robust in accom[ redating postulated neutronic upset conditions because the system's response is predictable and relatively insensitive (small power changes fw large reactivity changes) as long as the degree of subcriticidity is substantial, If the system is assumed to be initially at a multiplication of 0.98 and the same reactivity insertion event is postulated ( 1 $/s for I s), the power would chtinge by approxin.titely 1170. If the system is assumed to be initially at a multiplication of 0,99 and the same reactivity insertion event is postulated, the pow?r would change by approximately 25%. By selecting a substantial deb~ee of subcritically for an operating point, the system would have Iurge margins for reactivity chunges without becoming critical and thereby transitioning to the nonlinear response regime or becoming prompt critical without hope of control, Although these large margins and the decoupling of power changes from reactivity changes are attractive from the standpoint of the potential for power excursions, it is also true that desirable feedbacks such as those from system tempemture changes only weukly affect the power. Thus, inherent power control is largely delied~.~d must bs replaced with active control. Active control with absorber rods also would not be particularly effective because of the powerreactivity decoupling.
Thus, the active cent.ml would probably need to be done by varying the proton beam characteristics such that the neutron source intensity can be changed.
A second objective for reactor-type systems has always been to prowde the capability for highly reliable and rapid termination of the fission process (scram) if the control system were to fail or unforeseen reactivity increases were to occur. Of particular importance is the prevention of the prompt-critical condition in which the power rises at such a high rate that the core and potentially other ba.niers against the release of radioactive materials could be compromised.
Normally reactors have mechanically inserted neutron absorber components (shutdown rtis, safety rods, absorber balls, etc.) to provide the scram function. To achieve the desired high functional reliability of inserting these absorbers on demand, redundancy and diversity of components and systems are often employed. A high degree of assurance must be provided that core dimensicmal changes due to irradiation induced material swelling or thermal expansions do not prevent absorber insertion. Also a high degree of assurance must be provided that absorber insertion can be accomplished during seismic events. It is also important that the scram function be accomplished in the time interval required to intercept power excursions before safety limits are reached,
The situation is schematically portrayed in Fig. 2 . For a typical reactor system, if thie scram setting is reached, detectors sense the condition, the scram system sends signals to the actuation systems to insert the absorbers, the absorbers begin to move into the core as their inertia is overcome, negative reactivity is added to the core as the absorbers engage the core r.lore and more, the power rise is arrested, and the system is shutdown after a short period of time. Because of the delays associ~ted with absorber insertion, the power continued to rise above the scram point as shown. This power over-shoot for postulated transients must be predicted and insluded in the design of :he shutdown system to ensure [hat safety limits are nc. exceeded. If a similar event were to occur in an accelerator-driven subcritical sys!etn, the delays would be limited to those associated with dete';tion of the condition, scram system processing of the signals, and actuation of any number of betim interrupts.
OrIce the proton beam is in~etmpted, the source neutron production stops nearly insttintaneously and the power in the subcritical system drops promptly, Thus, the shutdown ci.in be accomplished quickly, predictably, and reliably following detection of the need for shutdown, The need for in-core neutron absorber insertion with the associated mechanical complexities is eliminated. The complexities associated with "managing" the -power over-shoot also are eliminated. 
Adequate Cooling
Assuring adequa~e cooling in all situations also has been recognized as an extremely important topic for fission reactors since :he beginnings of mtictor engineering.
Because the integrity of the first barrier (for discussion purposes, [k.: clad on fuel pins is considered the first barrkr) is a key elemenf in the defense-in-dep:i'r strategy for preventing the release of fission products and because this integrity is strongly linked to clad temperature, adequate cooling must be assu~ed for normal power operations, for a variety of off-normal situations includillg accidents, and for shutdown with the associated decay heat from the fission prc-duels.
For conventional solid fueled reactors with high power densities and wafer coolants, the clad temperature can rise rapidly if cooling is interrupted locally. The rate of temperature rise is related primarily to the heat capacity of the core rmaterials and the local pcwer density. Because the clad temperature rise can be rapid. cooling interruptions due to degraded local heat nansfcr processes (such as departure from nucleate tmiling) or insufficient coolant flow can not be tolerated. For the molten salt system, the first barrier is the primary system boundary (vessel, piping, heat exchanger tubes, etc.). The thermal response of [his first barrier is linked !O the heat capacity of the entire primary system, which is substantially larger than (hat of the core itlcne. As shown schematically in Fig. 3 , the rate of temperature rise would be much lower if cooling is interruptffi. This slow, system-wide response prcvides substantially irlcreased opportunities to sense inadequate ccwling conditions and to respond appropriately (such as scram, switching to emergency power, realigning valves, etc.), Thus, the molten s:ilt system exhibits a thermal robustness that is attractive,
The molten salt system also exhibits robustness frcm the standpoint of heat transfer and heat transport in the core re~im. Again the point of reference is a solid fueled, rod-type core. The heat Ransfer situation is shown schematically in Fig, 4 . The heat is genemted in the solid fuel material and is transfemed out of the fuel, across the fuel-cl:id gap, through [he clad, and to the surrounding coolant. The heat transfer processes include conduction, radiation, and convection. The overall heat transfer-heat transport process is sensitive to dimensional changes, fuel restructuring, fission ga~content in the gap, coolant pressure, coolant subcooling, and coolant velocity. Many of these aspects can change substantially during core life, for different operating modes, and for off-nonmd and accident conditions. Thus, the overall heat transfer-heat transport process is complex yet must be known reasonably well to assure adequate cooling and protection of the frost barrier under all circumstances.
Also shown in Fig. 4 is a schematic of a typical molten salt core (in the accelerator-driven system it is referred to M the blanket) in which the sali flows through a graphite moderating structure. Because the fissioning materials are in the flowing molten salt, the heat is generated directly in the molten salt, which is also the heat transport medium. Thus, all coLIpki heat transfer-heat transpo~processes are eliminated in the co~e. This arrangement also appears to have a self limiting characteristic i~that if cooling in the core (heat rransport in this case) is inadequate, the coolant/fuel salt over heats, evenmally boils, is ejected from the core, and effectively stops the fission process locally (fissioning materials remcved).
The final aspect of sssured cooling considered in this paper is that of decay heat removal, which also is extremely important for the protection of defense-in-depth barriers. A schematic comparison of the decay heat removul situation for the solid and fluid fueled systems is shown in Fig. 5 . For both s]stem, the challenge is to get the decay heat to an ultimate heat sink. 'The challenge of assuring an ultirrtate heat sink is the same for both systems, Again, however, there is the complexity in the solid fuel system of getting the heat rrom the compact core to the primary heat tiansport system. !n the molten salt system, the decay heat is genera[ed throughout the salt inventory in the primary system. Thus, this system has the possibility for predictable natural convection cooling to the primary system boundary and the possibility of radiant heat rejection from the primary system boundary to an external heat sink, if the individual systems are not too large. Tl~is could constitute a completely pmsive decay heat removal sy~tem.
Containment of Radioactive Materials
Because the accelerator-driven mol[en salt system operates at high power and involves a fission process, it has essentially all the hazards that are norm~'iy associfitc.d with con'lentional fission reactors, particularly with regard to fission products. The type ar,d quantities of fission products are different for the molten salt system (gaseous fission products will not remain in the molten salt and will have to be collected and stored in special systems that are sep~rate from the primary system), but will, never the less, constitute a formidable hazard. Thus, containment of the radioactive materials at all time and for all conditions must be accomplished for the molten salt system. The challenge of providing appropriate defense-in-depth barriers will need to lx met with a different approach for the molten salt system. In conventional reactors, the first barrier is a challenge to protect and to assure its funct~on, but it has a limited life requirement (approximately 3 years arci then it is replaced) and it is compartmentalized in the form @fmany individual sealed units (each fuel pin). Thus, if a few of the individual units of the first barrier fail for some reason, only a relatively small fraction of the fission product inventory is released to the next barrier. In contrast, if the first barrier (the primary sys:em boundary) of the molten salt system fails for some reason, essentially all the fission product inventory in the salt will be released to the next barrier.
The op~ions (o deal with this challenge appear to be [o assure high reliability in the performance of the primary system lmundary, to provide a highly reliitble and effective second banier, or both. Eecause the first bamier is not in [he core and therefore dews not affect neutronic performance and is generally accessible, design flexibility should exist to mak: the primary system boundary highly robust and to provide inspectability by remore means. Allhough, engineering design layouts of various options for the second b.urier have not been completed, the approach used for the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment [8] appears IO have merit and to be feasible, Sealed vaults with appropriate heat removal syslems, atmosphere control systems, spill recovery systems, etc. could be used. Finally, the defense-in-d~p[h barrier stra[egy would be completed with a surrounding containment or confinement struct~lre as appropriate. The barrier arrangements for a conventional reactor and for the molten salt system are shown schematically in Fig. 6 .
Another special challenge for the accelerator-d.tiven molten salt system is the integration Uf the beam transport equipment with the containment barriers. The proton beam can not pass directly through heavy-walled structures without substantial beam loss and the generation of fiignificant heat and radiation.
Some type of thin-window approach is necessmy. To accommochte the conflicting requirements of barrier robustness and beam window thinness, it may be necessary to make the beam transport tube pm of the barrier system. This woula probably require the beam tube to be a reentrant thimble through the outer containment barrier, the vault barrier, and the primary system ba~rier. The target system and its associated thin window would be positioned entirely within this thimble.
Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality
Prevention of inadvertent criticality in conventional reactors is a relatively straightforward matter because it is a concern only for fuel handling, new fuel storage, and spent fuel storage.
Because the fuel is in the solid state, is segregated into numerous individual assemblies, can be handled in a very controlled manner, can be monitored for structural deterioration, and can be stored in well characterized and robust structures (physical spacing and integrated neutron absorbers), it is extremely unlikely that an inadvertent criticality would occur.
In contrast, the molten salt system presents challenge: ''. assuring ttat the location of all fissile material is known at all times. The potential for precillitaticm of fissile materials from the molten salt under various expected and pos~ulated condi~ions'must be considered. The 
Radiation Exposur= to Personnel
Integrated exposure to the operating staff of a conventional reac[or power stalion has become a figure-of-merit for the quality of the operation; reliability of equipment; and the provisions in the design for ease of maintenance, inspections, testing, and repairs. The auelerator-driven molten salt system has the potential to present a considerable challenge to designer and operaIors relative to this figure-of-merit.
The challenge has its origin in four characteristics of the accelerator-driven molten salt system. First, the fissions products distributed throughout the primary system produce extremely high radiation fields in all areas adjacent to the primary system and potentially high exposures during incident recovery operations (spills) or eventual decontamination and decommissioning.
Second, delayed neutron production throughout the primary system activates all primary system equipment resulting in radiation exposure potentials even after decontamination.
Third, the target and thimble systems will have limited life and require frequent replacement, leading to exposure potentials. Fourth, the use of a lithium based salt will result in the generation of substantial nitium, which will diffuse through the metallic boundaries and produce exposure potentials. All of these exposure potentials will have to be recognized in the design proct~s, including those associated with postulated off-normal events, and special provisions will have to & included to protect workers during inspxtions, testing, maintenance, and repairs. A high premium will need to be placed on highly reliable equipment.
SUMMARY
The accelemtor-driven molten salt system has the potential to provide~bust, predictable, straightfonva.rd, attractive safety characteristics in the areas of power excursion prevention, assured shutdown, assured cooling, and energetic severe accident prevention.
Containment of radioactive materials through a defense-in-depth strategy is feasible for this system, but presents the challenge of integrating the proton beam tube with the desired robust barrier systems. Inadvertent criticality will require special attention in the design because of the decreased predictability of the location of all fissile materials in a fluid fueled system. Also special attention will be required in the design to manage the irwreased potentials for exposures to plant personnel arising from the distributed fission products in the primary system, extensive delayed neutron activation of equipment, target system replacement, and tritium control. It should be noted that the positive safety effects that result from subcritical op~ration can only be realized if the subcriticality s[atus of the system is continuously known and within required limits. This is a challenge, but some plausible approaches have been defined.
The fundamental safety objectives for reactor-like systems can be accomplished in an accelerator-driven molten salt system, albeit by very different means. Many of the desirable characteristics of advanced reactor systems delinefited by the USNRC can be provided by such a system. Others of these characteristics, such as providing easily maintained equipment and components and reducing the potential radiation exposure to plant personnel will be design challenges.
